In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.

In 2009, there was an attempt to take over the Hungarian oil company MOL by a Russian entity. Immediately, concern arose in Poland that a similar scenario was threatening Poland's flagship oil company, PKN Orlen.

At that time, the State Treasury held (and still holds) a stake of less than 30% shares in Orlen. This did not eliminate the risk that another shareholder might emerge in the company who might acquire more shares than held by the State Treasury.

The State Treasury therefore faced a dilemma as to how to secure its control over Orlen. Due to the limitations arising from EU law concerning the so-called "golden share", the State Treasury could not use legislative or administrative instruments. The solution had to be sought in corporate law.

Prof. Michał Romanowski developed a solution that became a permanent part of the standards of corporate policy of the State Treasury. The so-called statutory vote dispersal mechanism was introduced in Orlen. In simple terms, it consists in the introduction of a so-called voting cap (i.e. a statutory limitation on the exercise of voting rights over a certain threshold of votes, irrespective of the number of shares held) with the simultaneous exclusion from this limitation of those shareholders who hold a larger number of shares as at the day of adopting a resolution. In this way the State Treasury obtained a guarantee that no new shareholder would obtain more votes on its own (or by acting in concert). This mechanism was not questioned by the European Commission, as was the case in many other Member States.

This solution quickly became a standard in subsequent privatisations of the largest state-owned companies and was implemented in entities such as Tauron, GPW, Energa, PGE, PZU, PKO BP, Grupa Azoty or Lotos, as well as in many private companies.

An interesting example of the use of statutory vote dispersal was the (otherwise unsuccessful) 2015 attempt to defend investment funds against the acquisition of Bogdanka by the Poznan-based Enea. After Enea announced a PLN 1.5 billion tender offer for 66% of Bogdanka's shares, Bogdanka's supervisory board, controlled by open-ended investment funds, initiated an attempt to amend the articles of association to introduce a voting cap for new shareholders (implicitly: for Enea). The assumption was that after the tender offer was announced, Enea – not being able to withdraw from the tender offer – would offer a better price to the funds in exchange for not introducing the voting cap.

Romanowski i Wspólnicy, advising Enea on this project, successfully neutralised the funds' move by suspending the antitrust proceedings. In this way, Enea obtained an option to withdraw from the tender offer, and the funds, deprived of an instrument to put pressure on Enea, abandoned their attempt to amend the articles of association and accepted the price offered.

It is becoming more and more recognised that the annulment (invalidation, as some would say) of a Swiss franc credit facilities agreement is only the beginning, not the end, of the problems with such a credit facility.

When a court rules that a credit agreement has been annulled, banks claim compensation for the unjust use of capital by the (now former) borrower.

This view was first presented in more detail by Prof. Michał Romanowski in 2016 at a conference of the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw

Since a credit agreement is a contract for consideration, it is beyond doubt that the parties' consensual intention, and the purpose of the agreement, was to make someone else's capital available for use for remuneration, and therefore the retroactive annulment of the agreement requires a settlement of the capital received and the borrower's profit from the use of someone else's capital made available to the borrower. The use of someone else's money should not be treated differently from, for example, the use of someone else's home. It has an objective – and quite easily calculable – value.

Recognition of this issue is of fundamental importance to the assessment of the consequences of borrowers' claims. Remuneration for non-contractual use of capital is a tool that makes it possible to balance the interests of the bank and the borrower in a fair way. Naturally, the detailed mechanism of settlement will depend on the particular case.

The above issue has been recognised in case law. It has become so important that the First President of the Supreme Court formulated a legal question in this regard to the full composition of the Civil Chamber. Many commentators believe that of the six questions concerning Swiss franc credit facilities, the question concerning the possibility of demanding remuneration for non-contractual use of the capital is the most important.